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ABSTRACT: 
This paper explores the social construction of failure in development policy and academic 
narratives. Talk of failure is commonplace in development, and this paper seeks to use that 
as a heuristic to understand what that it signifies beyond face value. Drawing on a wide 
range of primary and secondary texts to provide illustrative evidence, the paper explores 
how failure is constructed, and advances a three-fold typology of failures that vary in terms 
of their positionality, the critical variables they identify as responsible, their epistemological 
stance, and the importance they accord to politics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the looking glass world of development,1 pessimism reigns, and things always fall apart. 
Dysfunctionality, collapse, disaster, poverty, famine, violence, and exploitation are not 
words used to signify the extraordinary, but are the normal vocabulary of everyday 
business. Many of the widely available texts on the subject present themselves as analytics 
of failure.  The title of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s book is Why Nations Fail. 
James Scott’s seminal book Seeing Like A State has the sub-title How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition have Failed”. Paul Collier’s Bottom Billion is similarly about 
Why the Poorest Countries are Failing. Dambisa Moyo’s book on Dead Aid is about Why Aid 
is not Working. Bill Easterly’s book on the White Man’s Burden is about Why the West’s 
Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so much Ill”.  
 
Negativity forms the everyday mood music in an environment where people are required to 
adopt a certain posture of mandatory outrage towards the underlying condition, as well as 
an air of impatience at the inadequate and flawed attempts to remedy it. In the conclusion 
to her monograph The Will to Improve, Tania Li writes of the ‘profound limits’ to 
development: ‘For vast numbers of people, it falls short of the promise to make the world 
better than it is (Li 2007:283). Arturo Escobar’s (1995:5) book on development discourse 
presents a similar dystopia where ‘instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by 
theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced 
its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and 
oppression.’ 
 
There are however, important reasons to be circumspect about this pervasive negativity, 
and to understand what it signifies beyond face value. At one level, failure simply attracts 
disproportionate attention. David Lewis (2005:474) notes, ‘the dominant emphasis has been 
to understand the reasons why they [development projects] fail with few studies bothering 
to understand why some projects succeed’. Development is famously a fluid, contested 
category with competing goals and metrics of success, so that every successful project can 
also be found to have failed by a different measure. Similarly, the existence of a variety of 
opposing ‘stakeholders’ means that what amounts to success for one group can be a costly 
failure for another.  
 
However, even when the goals and beneficiaries are unambiguous, the evidence base upon 
which this judgment can be made is complicated and contradictory. The intense ‘worm 
wars’ debate over the randomised control trial evidence of mass de-worming in east Africa 
demonstrates the extent to which the most authoritative and cutting-edge forms of impact 
evaluation can later be viewed as flawed and misleading (Miguel and Kremer 2004, Aiken et 
al 2015). The problems do not end there. Success and failure remain ephemeral and 
contested even when the evidence is accurate and uncontroversial. Paul Mosley (1986) 
describes the macro-micro paradox: how project success at the micro level often has no 
commensurate impact on macro level indicators of development. Andrew Natsios (2010) 
explains that because evaluations are often judged on the basis of ‘countable’ outputs, 
                                                 
1 The idea of development as a looking-glass world is borrowed from Raymond Apthorpe’s (2011) ‘Alice in 
Aidland’. 
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agency staff tend to promote projects that are amenable to easy measurement at the 
expense of more complex, developmentally transformative ones which cannot be easily 
enumerated. Consequently, many projects that are judged as successes at their end date 
are later found to have failed. Roger Riddell (2008:186) estimates that between 10%-25% of 
projects fail to meet immediate objectives, but judged in terms of impact several years 
hence, it is as high as 60%.  
 
One of the most widespread concerns about declarations of failure is that the criteria for 
determining success are arbitrary, based on ‘before versus after’ comparisons of outcomes 
to pre-determined objectives, irrespective of whether those objectives were ever 
achievable.2 Bill Easterley (2009) for example, argues that the design of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and their unachievable targets rendered what were actually 
impressive successes in Africa to be categorised as demoralising failures. Similarly, Kumar 
and Corbridge (2002) argue that DFID’s Eastern India Rainfed Farming Project (EIRFP) 
actually succeeded in many economic measures, but was declared a failure because it did 
not meet criteria that even its planners would probably agree, were impossible to meet. 
  
The problem of inappropriate outcome criteria is related to a broader methodological 
concern arising from the absence of appropriate real-world counter-factuals to make 
judgements against, and also from the issue of attribution - that is, isolating causality. 
Outside of the small subset of cases where counter-factual analysis is possible, for example, 
through the availability of randomised treatment and control groups of adequate size, how 
can one distinguish whether success or failure is to be attributed to the project intervention, 
to the underlying conditions, or to other exogenous and incidental factors? 
 
Finally, even beyond the illusion of countables and absent counter-factuals, success and 
failure can also be openly manipulated. As Parker and Allen (2014) describe at length, large 
donor-funded public health programmes in East Africa were continued, despite the fact that 
they did not work well. This occurred initially amidst a lack of knowledge and evidence - but 
later when evidence of weak uptake and widespread problems was collected and made 
available, a façade of ‘success’ was maintained by public health officials through strategic 
ignorance (McGoey 2012), as well as by actively seeking to suppress and discredit contrary 
evidence. 
 
What this means is that in evaluating the rhetoric of failure, it is important to bear in mind 
that real world development outcomes are notoriously complex to evaluate. Success or 
failure thus amount to much more than the accurate measurement of objective indicators, 
and are in many cases, the outcome of a certain process of negotiation and mediation. As 
Fejerskov (2016:366) notes in a case study of a manifestly dysfunctional development 
initiative, the evaluation outcome was indeed a ‘negotiated truth’ such that ‘the potential 
success of development projects does not necessarily have any connection to measurable 
results, but rather is found in the interpretation of events and actions’. Similarly, many 
external evaluators will recount with exasperation how project funders and agency staff 
with access to draft copies of evaluation reports vigorously challenge any negative findings 
                                                 
2 On ‘counterfeit’ counterfactuals, see (Gertler et al, 2016). 
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with a view to influencing the interpretation of failure and minimising personal culpability in 
the final version. 
 
In other words, failure cannot be seen as a self-evident outcome, but amounts to a 
particular performance that must be enacted, or a representation that must be generated. 
As David Mosse (2005) describes, in his ethnography of a rural development project in 
western India: 
 
development success is not merely a question of measures of performance; it is also about 
how particular interpretations are made and sustained socially. It is not just about what a 
project does, but also how and to whom it speaks, who can be made to believe in it (Mosse 
2005:158).  
 
Even in the formal and substantive evaluations of development outcomes, the verdict of 
failure must be actively constructed through a long chain of actions that begins with the 
decision over goals, the identification of measurement indicators, the way the data is 
collected, collated, and analysed, and the way results are contextualised, elaborated, and 
interpreted.  
 
The constructed nature of development failure does not mean that evaluations are all 
fiction, that careful measurements are impossible, or that rigorous evaluations should be 
cast aside. It does however, mean that there is more to failure than failure. The final 
judgments of effectiveness based on these evaluations often amount to much more than 
the sum of the parts. Indeed, unlike many other related fields, such as science and 
technology studies, the constructed nature of development effectiveness is less 
controversial, and easier to illustrate. The idea that scientific knowledge is socially 
constructed within the laboratory (Latour and Woolger 1979) is contested and even 
ridiculed as absurd by real world scientists. A similar accusation about development 
effectiveness evaluation would, however, likely encounter less resistance by a jury of peers 
composed of real world development professionals.  
 
The idea that failure is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966) is significant insofar 
as any evaluation is not an individual effort, but requires the collaboration of a community 
of actors to produce and consume it: a collective who frame it in that way, and to whom it 
belongs and speaks to. It follows then that narratives of development can often say more of 
the narrators themselves, and of the way that they choose to see and frame the evidence in 
particular ways. As Entman (1993:52) describes, this process of framing is: 
 
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. 
 
The counter-part to the production process of such narratives is its consumption, and the 
way that its consumers are clustered in communities that adopt particular versions of what 
the social psychology literature has explained as the ‘confirmation bias’. As Nickerson (1998: 
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175) describes, this involves ‘the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial 
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand’. 
 
There is an important corollary to this: the existence of different social collectives, 
disciplinary traditions, and moral frames of reference within the development field means 
that there are different constructions of failure that are possible. The same project can be 
seen to have failed for different reasons by different groups of people, and moreover, these 
reasons can be incompatible with one another. This is the case for example with the 
evaluation of structural adjustment, one of the most important and controversial policy 
interventions in the 1980s and 1990s. Although there is widespread agreement that 
structural adjustment lending and conditionality-based policy reforms failed, the available 
diagnoses differ radically.   
 
Failure is on the one hand, attributed in numerous World Bank documents of the 1980s to 
an implementation problem: that is, the failure of its borrowers (developing country 
governments) to implement the agreed conditionalities. In more considered accounts, this 
inability is explained in terms of a lack of ownership, weak capacity, poor governance, or 
political instability. Writing from within the World Bank, Dollar and Svenson (2000: 895) find 
that more than one-third of adjustment programmes fail, and that ‘domestic political 
economy variables’ such as political instability or length of government tenure are primarily 
responsible. Importantly, these domestic problems are assumed to be independent and 
exogenous: that is, they are the cause of programme failure, not its consequence. 
 
In contrast, external critiques of structural adjustment often blame the lender rather than 
the borrower. Within this, there are two versions: firstly it is criticised as a poorly designed 
‘cookie-cutter’ approach that lacked an understanding of the local political, economic, and 
social context. As a result, it was so deeply flawed that it caused negative developmental 
consequences, ranging variously from poverty to de-industrialisation (Cornia et al 1987, 
Harrigan and Mosley 1991, Easterly 2005, Huber and Solt 2004, Weyland 2004). Moreover, 
and in sharp contrast to the causal logic that political instability caused programme failure, 
influential variants of this explanation suggests the opposite: that it was flawed structural 
adjustment programmes that generated political instability and poor governance. 
 
Secondly, a very different explanation describes the failure of structural adjustment as the 
product of a hidden agenda to promote the predatory economic ambition of wealthy 
domestic and international elites. David Harvey’s (1995) distinction between neoliberalism 
in theory versus practice provides one version of this narrative. He finds that behind the 
technocratic promise of a market utopia lies its real objective, which is a political project for 
the restoration and deepening of capitalist class rule. Within critical development studies, 
this explanation belongs to the family tree of dependency theory, which is not just generally 
critical of the efficacy of market-friendly economic solutions, but specifically views it as a 
way through which poor countries are adversely incorporated and trapped in an exploitative 
relationship within a global economic hierarchy.  
 
Consider also the critique of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and the role of development actors in 
countries affected by violent conflict. The attempt to recreate stable public authority and 
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economic growth in divided societies from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
is widely thought to be inadequate and flawed. As with structural adjustment though, there 
are many versions of failure which do not just identify different causes, but adopt entirely 
different analytical perspectives to approach it.  
 
The failure of liberal peacebuilding is on the one hand, found to arise because of poor 
coordination between military and civilian actors, bad sequencing between agencies, 
inadequate funding, a top-heavy international presence, or other such operational issues 
(SIGIR 2013).  Other accounts explain the failure of the mission in terms of the inability to 
understand local society and politics, so that the mission is based on a flawed understanding 
of the dynamics of change (Paris 2004, Uvin 1998). Finally, there is, a distinct strand of 
writing which faults liberal peacebuilding as a project of imperialist or neoliberal capture 
(Duffield 2001), so that the enduring chaos and failure of the project belies the fact that it 
actually serves an ulterior motive that serves powerful outside actors.  
 
The project may well have failed on its own terms, but the hidden agenda will have 
prevailed and succeeded. In both of these examples, the common consensus that the 
project has failed occludes the fact that there are distinct variants of failure in circulation, 
and moreover, that these bear assumptions, diagnoses, and implications that stand entirely 
at odds with one another.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with the idea of failure in development. It seeks to analyse 
narratives of failure in order to understand what they amount to, how they are structured, 
and what their implications are. What are the consequences of this pessimism for the larger 
enterprise and project of development, and can it be said to have productive effects?  These 
questions are approached by decomposing failure narratives into a three-fold typology of 
failure narratives that relate to their disciplinary origins, epistemological stance, and the 
way that they articulate ‘the political’.  
 
The significance of politics as a category of explanation here requires greater explanation. In 
an industry that has famously been described as the 'anti-politics machine', and that draws 
its theoretical basis and framings within the positivist tradition of mainstream academic 
economics, it is this relationship between politics and the technical-scientific core of 
development theory that has received the greatest attention in critical studies of 
development. Since the 1980s, politics has gained an increasing presence, both in the 
‘political turn’ of mainstream development theory, and also in the way it has been 
incorporated into practice (Carrothers and De Gramont 2013). As Dollar and Svenson 
(2000:894) describe: 
 
Development assistance shifted to a large extent in the 1980s from financing investment 
(roads and dams) to promoting policy reform. This reorientation arose from a growing 
awareness that developing countries were held back more by poor policies than by a lack of 
finance for investment. 
 
The growth of politics as a category of relevance within the theory and practice of 
development has occurred alongside the discovery of the ubiquity of politics and micro-
 7 
power in the social sciences more broadly, particularly after Foucault. The idea that 
‘everything is political’ has been important in revealing the complex operation and effects of 
power across the social landscape in far more sophisticated ways (Curtis and Spencer 2012). 
Power and politics are not restricted to the formality of the state and electoral competition, 
but are present in discourse, subjectivity, and even everyday forms of behaviour. The 
implications of this expansive ontology of politics are significant, and have opened up new 
landscapes of investigation and speculative reflection.  
 
However, the incorporation of politics in development and beyond also means that it can 
also take a certain magical, fetishized character: it assumes the form of an omnipresent, 
supernatural force of boundless, unfathomable dimensions and capacities that can be held 
responsible for any number of outcomes as well as their very opposites. Politics is deemed 
to be everywhere in spirit, and is constantly spoken of in development. But it is also elusive, 
and difficult to grasp and predict, so that it often requires the mediation of a priestly 
interlocutor, learnèd in ethnographic methods and critical development theory to make it 
visible and accessible. The fact that many development agency and project staff have a 
science or engineering background, or else are quantitative economists also lends a 
mystique of the unknown to the political, which is consequently used to box in a wide range 
of otherwise inexplicable acts of mundane misfortune.  
 
There is as such, a need to de-mystify politics, to parse its meaning, to challenge those that 
use it to explain themselves better. While it is well beyond the scope and space available in 
this paper to address this task adequately, the analysis of failure narratives provides an 
opportunity to denaturalise politics, and to take a step in this direction.  
 
In terms of definitions, it should be clear by now that development in this paper primarily 
concerns what Gillian Hart (2001) describes as ‘big-D’, the enterprise that Cowen and 
Shenton (1996) describe as purposive or intentional development. It is the world of policies, 
planners, and projects. The protagonists of relevance here are those who produce, 
consume, and circulate development narratives: national policy-makers, aid donor staff, 
academics, think tanks researchers, journalists, evaluation experts, parliamentary 
committees, NGO activists, and advocacy groups. Yet, the alternate use of the word, ‘little-
d’ development, or the universe of immanent ongoing socio-economic change (what Hart 
2001:650 describes the ‘development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly 
contradictory set of historical processes’), also has a critical presence in the discursive 
construction of development failure because it constitutes the underlying problematic. 
Little-d development constitutes the space where poverty, insecurity, ill health, and 
corruption are said to be located and where they are reproduced. It is in that sense, the 
underlying pathology that resists solution, and that hence, plays a critical role in sustaining 
the perpetual cycle of failure. 
 
As a study of policy narratives and texts, this paper is connected to the tradition of 
discourse analysis in development studies (Escobar 1995, Apthorpe 1986, Ferguson 1994, 
Crush 1995). The study of authoritative policy and operational documents contains 
important insights about the way that development is conceived, how its key metaphors 
function, how it is imbricated with power, and how deeply political matters are rendered 
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into bland technicalities and jargon. However, the approach in this paper is also a departure 
from this tradition to the extent that although it is based upon the review of a large number 
of primary texts, including over one hundred World Bank project documents,3 it is not a 
systematic study of discourse as such. Rather, it draws upon a wide range of accessible 
primary and secondary texts to provide illustrative evidence as needed to advance an 
argument that is largely conceptual and theoretical in nature. Secondly, in this paper, I view 
much of the discourse analysis literature not just as fraternal and contextual points of 
reference but also as an important part of the empirical matter under study. That is, the 
work for example, of Arturo Escobar or James Ferguson should be seen not just for their 
insights, but also because they themselves constitute original, influential and significant 
development narratives. They must as such, necessarily be viewed as objects of study to be 
placed within the frame of analysis, to be situated against other such representations of 
development failure. 
 
The following three sections elaborate on the core subject matter of this paper, by 
providing an outline of three types of development failures. These are, in brief: 
implementation failures, design failures, and agenda failures. Implementation failures 
diagnose development outcomes as management or logistical issues. Design failures 
understand failure as the result of flawed analytics and inadequate knowledge of the 
problem. Finally, agenda failures explain the problem as the result of irredeemably 
hierarchical nature of development and the hidden, self-serving political motivations at 
play. 
 
 
2. IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE 
The most basic narrative of development failure is in the technical realm of implementation. 
Failures of this kind arise quite simply because the planned intervention is not executed 
properly according to its specification. The overall objective, rationale, framework, or design 
of the project itself is not under scrutiny, so that the diagnosis lies either in management 
issues such as balancing the time-cost-quality triangle, or in disruptions by entirely 
exogenous, unplanned risk factors. For example, quantitative studies drawn from the World 
Bank’s database of internal evaluations of over 11,000 projects have identified the key 
sources of failure as supervision (Kilby 2000), cost and schedule over-runs (Ahsan and 
Gunawan 2010), or proper monitoring and evaluation (Raimondo 2016).  
 
Implementation failures are typically assembled within the internal ‘engine room’ of 
development organisations, where the analytical imagination is constrained not just by its 
cognitive frames of technicality but also by a heavy dose of reality arising from an intimate 
knowledge of what is operationally feasible. When translated into the context of policy 
rather than a project, implementation failures are often described as ‘governance’ failures. 
                                                 
3 Of a total 11,747 projects in the World Bank internal evaluation online database, 365 are rated ‘highly 
satisfactory’, 2359 are ‘moderately satisfactory’, 2884 are ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, 5701 are ‘satisfactory’, 
2043 are ‘unsatisfactory’, and 158 are ‘highly unsatisfactory’. I reviewed all of the project completion and 
evaluation documents of the ‘highly unsatisfactory’ category which are accessible online, and 25 reports 
randomly drawn from the ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘moderately unsatisfactory’ category. 
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This genre of critique, and the way it attributes responsibility within the bounds of 
implementation corresponds to a particular analytical approach in which failure, 
dysfunctionality or collapse are viewed as a straight-forward function of a set of self-
evident, proximate, direct causal factors, and to a positivist epistemological stance that 
understands these observable variables to yield answers through causal analysis. In conflict 
studies, this would be termed an analysis of ‘trigger factors’ of the outbreak of violence, 
rather than the deeper structural factors.  
 
Implementation failures also often constitute the verdict produced by project monitoring 
and evaluation, in which a given logframe is the basis on which auditors check whether 
specified activities have been carried out to schedule, and measure if objectively verifiable 
outcome indicators have been met. For example, the internal evaluation of a $48 million 
World Bank project on health in Cameroon initiated in 1995 showed it to be ‘highly 
unsatisfactory’. The reasons for this were that the: ‘project scope was well beyond the 
Government’s implementation capacities, and implementation was delayed because of 
poor project preparation, inexperience and rapid turnover of Government staff, and lack of 
timely availability of counterpart funding’ (World Bank 2002). Another such World Bank 
internal evaluation of a $50 million road infrastructure project in Kenya from 1984 ascribes 
failure to ‘inadequate organization within the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
and a lack of counterpart financing’ (World Bank 1995). Indeed, in the 1% of World Bank 
projects rated internally as ‘highly unsatisfactory’, it is such issues as lack of capacity, 
funding, ownership, or oversight that are most commonly found by internal evaluators to be 
at fault (World Bank IEG database).  
 
One of the largest and most ambitious such project evaluations that has ever been 
conducted is of the reconstruction of Iraq in 2003-13 in the aftermath of the US-led military 
invasion that deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein. Among other important and 
disturbing details, the final report of the US Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR 2013) revealed that $8 billion of the total $60 billion spent was either 
wasted or unaccounted for. However, what stands out in this otherwise comprehensive and 
rigorous account is that it is silent on the original sin that fathered these subsequent 
problems. In place of any mention of the military invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the enduring 
destabilisation that it engendered, the report instead identifies seven key operational 
problems. These are (i) better civil-military coordination; (ii) focus on small projects and the 
need to wait for security to be established before rebuilding; (iii) ensuring host-country buy-
in; (iv) better systems to manage inter-agency conflict; (v) better oversight and 
accountability; (vi) preserve and refine success stories; (vii) better planning, advance 
planning.  
 
Failure is - without any hint of irony - attributed to a narrow set of technical shortcomings 
that seem to manifestly evade mention of the obvious political elephants in the room. In 
James Ferguson’s (1994) description of the anti-politics machine, sanitised narratives of 
implementation failures of this kind are imbued with deeper, hidden, political import. 
However, if instead of reading a pre-determined view of politics into a text, one looks 
instead for the ways that ‘the political’ is actually understood and used within it, then there 
are a different set of insights available. In the landscape of technical-managerial 
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development and the knowledge frames that it rests on, politics is not absent by 
thoughtless omission, or as Tania Li (2007) describes, because it has been neutered and 
‘rendered technical’. Politics is absent simply because it is terra incognita: an unknown, 
uncharted zone located outside the frame of competence and that can hence not be 
properly understood or anticipated. Where it appears, ‘politics’ is understood as a category 
of exogenous risk to the implementation of the economic or scientific technicalities of the 
project, not dissimilar to the way ‘acts of god’ are understood in contract law.  
 
For example, the World Bank’s $15 million enterprise rehabilitation project in the Central 
African Republic in 1999 was found internally to have failed due to ‘severe political 
instability’, and there is also the indication that many of the project files were destroyed in 
this violence (World Bank 2000). Similarly, a public sanitation project in Moldova in 2007, 
which, its evaluators stressed, was sound and worthwhile, collapsed and was cancelled 
because of ‘political pressure’. As the evaluation described: 
 
Though the objectives of the project were relevant and consistent with country strategies, 
and the design if implemented was relevant and so likely to achieve the project outcomes, … 
During implementation, disputes on land registration and opposition to the use of the land 
for the waste water treatment plant re-emerged, contributing to a lack of implementation 
progress (World Bank 2014). 
 
That is, implementation failed because politics occurred. Politics is in that sense, seen as a 
largely unanticipated disturbance that stands outside the frame of analysis or reference, 
that interrupted the planned execution of the project. The implication is that in the absence 
of this factor, the project would have successfully met its objectives. Similarly, failures in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s programmes have also been attributed to 
unanticipated political factors - ‘ethnic and linguistic divisions, strong special interests, and 
lack of political cohesion’ – which are clearly beyond the control of the programme’s 
planners and implementers (Ivanova et al 2001: 1). 
 
To summarise, in the field of implementation, the diagnosis of failure lies with proximate 
problems in completing the project, not with the objective or design of the project itself. 
Politics is present insofar as it constitutes an exogenous risk factor that often serves to 
influence the outcome, but that is not linked to the project logic. As a result, it is left largely 
un-analysed, and is often presented as an obscure and unknown factor. This is not to say 
that putatively political matters as such are entirely absent, because many issues such as 
social capital, civil society, governance, participation, or gender empowerment have long 
since been integrated as core elements of the development agenda (Bebbington et al 2004). 
But having thus been understood, incorporated, and turned into project implementables, 
they are no longer part of what constitutes that unknown and unpredictable void that 
constitutes the political. 
 
 
3. DESIGN FAILURE 
Secondly, there is a deeper and more critical level of analysis that views failure not because 
of flawed implementation, but because of a flawed plan. That is, the fault lies not with the 
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management and execution, but in the underlying design of the intervention itself, so that it 
cannot, even if well implemented, have succeeded. This explanation suggests that there are 
weaknesses in the goals, assumptions, metrics, and analytics, born essentially of a failure to 
grasp the complexities of the problem at hand.  
 
Failure of this kind draws on an epistemological stance that visualises the problem not as 
isolated and self-contained, but as a component of an underlying systemic failure. The 
analogy from conflict analysis would thus explain violence not in terms of its superficial 
trigger factors, but in terms of a wider circle of causation than is immediately apparent. The 
diagnostics thus takes the outcome (failure) as an entry point to excavating and revealing 
that larger system. What this means is that rather than identifying the problem as one of 
‘governance’ failures, this approach would seek to probe beyond that, to seek out why it is 
that governance fails.   
 
The fact that such failures arise from inadequate knowledge of the underlying dynamics at 
work means that it is often analysed by those who claim expert knowledge in the science 
and social science of development. While earlier design failures were often attributed to 
poor scientific knowledge (for example the 1947 Tanganyika groundnut scheme, which 
failed because of inappropriate soil and rainfall conditions), the changing nature of 
development since the 1970s has increasingly found that it is poor social science knowledge 
that is wanting.4 Raymond Apthorpe’s (1970:7, cited in Porter 1995) observation on the 
discovery of the ‘human factor’ from the 1960s captures this phenomenon well:  
 
There is a recurring tendency to explain the failure of predominantly economic development 
plans by invoking the following reason. There must have been a troublesome knob on the 
development machine, marked “the human factor,” which was twiddled wrongly, 
inadequately, or not at all, and therefore, somehow, “the non-economic variables” were left 
out of account. 
 
Indeed, it is at this level that many of the well known academic critiques of development 
engage, based on expertise in economics, politics, and area studies. In Development Projects 
Observed, Albert Hirschman (1967) describes how project design has inherent cognitive 
limitations, and must contend with a wide range of unpredictables. James Scott (1998) 
argues that planners at the apex, ‘seeing like a state’ have a limited ability to grasp the 
realities on the ground, so that their promethean visions of top-down transformation have 
perverse and tragic outcomes. Robert Chambers (1983) has similarly diagnosed failure as a 
product of the inadequate understanding of what poor people need or know. 
 
The challenges of implementing policy reform in the 1980s, and the search for why ‘good 
policies’ repeatedly fail to be implemented has drawn the development agenda and the 
study of development deeper into the realm of politics. Adrian Leftwich (2005:574) explains 
that the failure of development in the early 1980s signified a new understanding that the 
economic goals of transformation could only succeed if it was understood to be embedded 
                                                 
4 Moreover, the growth of new fields such as behavioural economics is increasingly pushing the frontier out 
further, so that development failures are being identified not in social or economic structures, but in the human 
mind (World Bank 2014).  
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within political ground realities. The turning point was, as he explains, ‘the recognition that 
non-economic factors – primarily political, but also social and cultural – needed to be much 
more fully comprehended. In the 1990s, influential critiques of the role of aid in conflict - 
such as Peter Uvin’s (1998) work on the role of foreign aid in the Rwandan genocide - led to 
a further impetus for the political sensitisation of development aid.  
 
As such, development failures which identified a flaw in the project design carried an 
entirely different understanding of ‘the political’. Politics no longer presented itself an 
unknowable external risk factor, but became the missing element of the project design that 
required recognition and insertion. This shift is evident in the changing analysis of failure in 
World Bank project evaluations in the 1990s. In contrast to those of the 1980s that found 
‘capacity’ or ‘political will’ at fault, the internal evaluation of a failed $20 million World Bank 
project on devolved service delivery in Guinea scheduled over 2000-11 was far more critical 
of the inability to anticipate the political sensitivities at stake:  
 
In a project involving deconcentration and devolution, the Bank team should have a strong 
understanding of the political economy of reform, and anticipate the opposition in order to 
inform project planning.  (World Bank 2006) 
 
Similarly, Suma Chakrabarti, then DFID permanent secretary explained: 
 
Usually, we have a good idea about what needs to be done to achieve poverty reduction, but 
are much less clear about why it’s not happening. All too often, we attribute slow or no 
progress to lack of political will ... It’s this black box of lack of political will that DOC analysis 
unpacks. This should result in this phrase disappearing from the risk column of a Country 
Assistance Plan or Regional Assistance Plan (quoted in Thornton and Cox, 2005: 2). 
 
Consequently, design failure prompted the insertion of new forms of political knowledge 
into the project and policy design, captured in the rise of ‘political economy’ as a formal 
analytical tool (Hudson and Leftwich 2014). An OECD review of that early period described 
how political economy analysis of this kind was considered to be: ‘at the cutting edge of 
development co-operation’ (OECD DAC 2005:3). By the late-1990s, many of the large 
bilateral and multilateral donors were developing formal political economy toolkits to be 
inserted into project evaluation and design (Hout 2012, Copestake and Williams 2014). 
USAID’s ‘Democracy and Governance Assessment’ (USAID 2000), the UK Department of 
International Development (DFID)’s ‘Drivers of Change’ analysis (Warrener 2004), or the 
World Bank’s Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGR) and the more recent Problem-
Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis (PGPE) - are all tools that emerged to 
systematise project design with political knowledge. A series of newer initiatives and ideas, 
such as ‘Doing Development Differently’ or ‘Thinking Politically’, signify the next generation 
of practice that seeks to incorporate political knowledge more integrally.  
 
To summarise, the idea of design failure suggests that development projects are often 
poorly informed and conceived, have a flawed ‘theory of change’, and lack awareness of the 
complexities of the problem at hand. One of the important complexities that has received 
wide consideration is politics, and it has led to the idea that politics needs to be better 
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theorised and captured within the conceptualisation of all development interventions. For 
that reason, design failure analysis has provided the impetus for the transformation in the 
nature of knowledge about politics, signified in the shift from its dismissal as an unknowable 
‘political risk’ to the commissioning and incorporation of political economy analysis. 
 
 
4: (HIDDEN) AGENDA FAILURE 
Beyond the realm of implementation and design, there is a third and yet deeper version 
that explains the failure of development in terms of the underlying objectives of its patrons 
and funders. The central axiom that governs this narrative and drives its analysis is the 
hierarchical nature of development, and the impossibility of transcending it. Whether in 
terms of planners versus people, donor versus recipients, or projects versus beneficiaries, 
the fundamental impulse of the dominant party is to extract benefit from the subservient 
one. Development is thus the pursuit of those self-interested objectives, while the language 
and rhetoric of upliftment and selfless generosity euphemise that reality and provide it with 
the legitimacy to render it acceptable.  
 
The thin version of this critique involves issues such as ‘tied aid’, or similar cases where 
commercial or foreign policy objectives diminish development effectiveness. The Pergau 
dam scandal of the 1990s, and its connection to arms purchases from the UK is one of the 
most emblematic cases in point (Lankester 2013). As an Oxfam policy report asserts:  
 
The effectiveness of aid is tied closely to why it is given … many donors still attempt to use 
aid to further their own foreign policy priorities. … Governments need to recognise that 
attempting to use aid for their own political and economic means … detracts from its 
potential impact on reducing poverty and inequality (Oxfam 2010: 13-14). 
 
The more substantial, thick version of agenda failure occurs where the patron’s self-
interested motives take on a much greater role, to the extent that developmental objectives 
are subsumed or distorted by it. For example, the literature on ‘securitisation’ has explained 
how aid and development goals such as poverty are increasingly rationalised and oriented 
to serve donor country security imperatives related to terrorism or refugees. As Howell and 
Lind (2009:1280) describe, ‘The encapsulation of development into US foreign policy and 
security strategy has resulted in significant changes in the orientation and emphasis of US 
development assistance’. Mark Duffield (2001) argues that the militarized humanitarian-
development missions that proliferated in the post cold world are part of a global regime 
innovated and improvised by powerful wealthy countries in order to govern the dangerous, 
disintegrating periphery.  
 
David Whyte’s (2010:134) evaluation on the reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq is also a 
case in point, and is to be contrasted against the very different diagnosis provided by the US 
government’s audit described earlier: 
 
Systemic fraud and bribery served a useful purpose for the Anglo-American occupation as 
part of a broader economic strategy designed to provide structural advantages to western 
firms entering the Iraqi economy. Routine corporate criminality, facilitated by the 
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government of occupation, was an important means of producing and reproducing 
(neo)colonial power relations. 
 
There are important differences to note in the cognitive basis and analytical structure of 
failure in the hidden agenda narrative. Whereas the task of analysing design failure is one of 
uncovering the larger social dynamics, in agenda failure it is often one of unmasking a 
hidden project and the economic/political relations at stake. Rather than viewing 
dysfunctionality and its causes as an end-point of analysis in itself, this version sees failure 
as functional, generating ‘instrument effects’, or else serving as a heuristic device through 
which it is possible to gain insights into a deeper agenda or pathology not immediately 
apparent – and to which it may not itself be directly connected. Dysfunctionality is thus not 
the problem, or even a component of the problem, but perhaps just a vehicle or symptom 
of it.5 It is to this genre of failure that dependency theory also belongs: the persistent 
poverty and distorted development trajectories at the periphery are to be understood in 
terms of the functional role they play in sustaining the global capitalist system at large, and 
within it, the prosperity of the advanced capitalist countries. Much the same is the case with 
the articulation of structural adjustment as a predatory project of neocolonialism or 
neoliberalism. 
 
The task of actually constructing convincing and well substantiated narratives of hidden 
agenda failure is intensely demanding, as it requires an evaluation of the development 
project, an investigation of the underlying political or economic dynamics, and also a 
deconstruction of the discursive veil. For this reason, it has become particularly suited to 
anthropologists of development, who have combined ethnographic research and discourse 
analysis to produce some of the most original and articulate narratives at hand.  
 
For example, the study of ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ schemes of micro-entrepreneurship have 
provided some very revealing new ways of understanding development failure. Drawing on 
ideas of responsibilization, they have articulated the ways in which projects justified in 
terms of gender empowerment and poverty alleviation have actually promoted neoliberal 
subjectivities and a broader political-economic realignment. In Katharine Rankin’s (2001:20) 
account of the making of ‘rational economic woman’ she argues that: 
 
microcredit must also be recognized as a state strategy that constitutes social citizenship 
and women’s needs in a manner consistent with a neoliberal agenda. As such it illustrates 
clear connections between state power and gender oppression.  
 
But the hidden effects of development projects are not an innovation of the neoliberal era: 
they were present in James Ferguson’s ethnography of the pre-neoliberal Thaba-Tseka 
project in Lesotho from the early 1980s. Ferguson’s analysis starts with a persuasive account 
of design failure, caused by a poor understanding of the local economy and livelihood 
patterns. However, as Tania Li explains, his account did not just stop at asking ‘why’: 
 
                                                 
5 There is also a similar approach evident in the way that extraordinary moments of rupture and collapse, such 
as natural disasters or mass panics, serve as a lens through which otherwise obscured political realities are 
rendered visible (Venugopal 2015, 2017, Guggenheim 2014: 6-7).  
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We need to go beyond the question posed by Scott - why have certain schemes designed to 
improve the human condition failed? - to examine the question posed by Ferguson: What do 
these schemes do? What are their messy, contradictory, multilayered and conjunctural 
effects? (Li: 2005:384).  
 
Indeed, Ferguson famously uncovered function hidden within dysfunction. Even in failure, 
the project succeeded by expanding bureaucratic state power in a region hostile to the 
ruling government. This deeper agenda was not a conscious part of the project design - and 
its designers were entirely unaware of it. But, explains Ferguson, it was a ‘larger unspoken 
logic that transcends the question of planners’ intentions.’ Moreover, the depoliticised 
language of development served to conceal this logic and present it as a technical problem. 
This is how he famously describes the ‘anti-politics’ machine, in which political operations 
are stealthily hidden behind neutral technical authority: 
 
a development project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations 
involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, 
under cover of a neutral technical mission to which no one can object. (Ferguson 1994: 256)  
 
In understanding the structure of these accounts of development failure, there is an 
important point to add that is missing in Tania Li’s above explanation: Ferguson and the 
architects of agenda failure do not stop at explaining the effects of development, but 
invariably manage to find a malign and troubling purpose at work behind the scenes. As 
David Mosse (2013:230) notes, this literature ‘unnecessarily ties insight into pessimism’. 
Lurking behind the selfless generosity and language of upliftment is shown to be the 
opposite: the narrow, self-serving extraction of wealth and the assertion of political 
domination.  
 
It should be clear then that ‘the political’ thus constructed in this version of failure, and its 
relationship to the technical-economic core of development is entirely different to the 
‘political risk’ or ‘political economy’ analysis in the previous two narratives. In the former, 
the frame was entirely technical, and politics stood outside. In the latter, politics was 
introduced and analytically integrated into the technical frame. In this third version 
however, politics, which arises inexorably from the hierarchical nature of the relationships 
involved, takes over the frame entirely and casts the technicalities aside. The technical 
economic content of development projects are dismissed here an ephemeral instrument, or 
a discursive veil. When that veil falls away, it is politics - a self-interested impulse to 
dominate and exploit - that stands exposed as the resilient social reality. It is in that sense, 
an argument of the primacy of the political. As Carl Schmitt contends, politics is a 
fundamental, autonomous social reality, and a distinct explanation of human behaviour that 
is both irreducible, and also resilient to the liberal model of technocratised containment 
(Schmitt 2007, Sartori 1989, Mouffe 1999, McCormick 1997). 
 
In summary, this third narrative of failure arises because the underlying goals of the project 
are problematic, and often diverge from real developmental needs. This approach departs 
entirely from any presumption about the stated intentions of the development industry, 
and views its failure as functional and subservient to an underlying, hidden, often predatory 
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ambition. Failure is in that sense, not a judgment on any individual development project, 
but on the futility of the larger enterprise. The hierarchical nature of the relationships are 
the insurmountable social reality, and it is in this sense that politics is understood and 
deployed.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has taken the persistent discourse of failure in development as a point of 
departure to understand what it signifies, how it is structured, and what consequences it 
bears. That is, it does not intend to explain why development fails, but rather why it is 
constantly said to fail. This task is approached firstly by positing failure as a socially 
constructed category. With multiple, changing sets of beneficiaries, definitions, goals, and 
indicators of success, and outcomes that are multi-layered, evolve over time, hard to 
measure, and generate unpredictable externalities, every successful project can also be 
reinterpreted as a failure. As Bruno Latour (1996: 35-36 in Mosse 2004:) remarks, ‘projects 
do not fail, they are failed’, so that even the formal evaluations of failure are not self-
evident, but are representations that must be actively produced and sustained. 
 
Secondly, failure itself is not a stable and self-contained category: the singularity of the term 
obscures and conflates the many different processes which are given this label. These 
different versions may be totally unconnected with one another, and even be mutually 
incompatible. For example, during the 1980s-90s, development was viewed as a failure for 
very different reasons both by the post-development left, and by the market liberalising 
right. A different decomposition of failure in this paper provides a three-fold categorisation 
of the common narratives in circulation, based on implementation, design, and agenda. The 
differences between these narratives reflect social-occupational positionalities, disciplinary 
traditions, epistemological approaches, and understandings of the political. Implementation 
failure is typically a critique of technical-managerial-governance ineptitude. Design failure 
blames inadequate expert knowledge and a flawed theory of change. The hidden agenda 
failure speaks of the entrenched hierarchical relationships, and the resilient impulse to 
dominate and exploit that define the development enterprise.  
 
It should be readily conceded that these are synthetic, idealised categories, and that many 
narratives do not neatly fit entirely within any one of them. For example, implementation 
failures can often be ascribed to weak design. Some of the more careful and analytically 
considered operational reports of World Bank projects, particularly of the early 1990s, 
elaborate at length on this. That is, the inability to successfully complete projects were 
found to reflect rushed appraisals, poor technical evaluations, and a failure to build in 
contingencies for plausible risks into the project design. Similarly, much of the critical 
academic research on development failure straddles both the design and the agenda 
critique. Both of these versions seek to bring empirical research and expert knowledge to 
bear, in order to uncover the hidden politics that causes dysfunctionality. Where they 
ultimately part ways is in their prognosis about whether the political realities that they 
reveal subsume development, or whether they can be overcome and made to serve it. 
Design failures are an optimistic and ‘constructive’ critique of development: they seek to 
bring political knowledge to bear in order to improve and enhance design, and to facilitate 
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project and policy outcomes. The hidden agenda failure on the other hand is pessimistic 
about this prospect, and implies that social change occurs in the political realm, outside the 
development frame.  
 
Are these narratives unique to development? What insights are available in other social 
science literatures?  In the world of business and entrepreneurship, where the evaluation of 
success and failure is far more personalised, and where the role of hierarchy and personal 
financial motives is more transparent, there are a similar set of divergent failure narratives 
between owners, managers, and employees (Cardon et al, 2011, Mantere et al, 2013). In 
large part, this is explained through ‘attribution theory’ (Martinko et al, 2007), so that 
individuals construct explanations that attach success to their own actions and attribute 
failure to factors beyond their control. 
 
More similar and far more relevant to development is the idea of ‘wicked problems’ (Rittell 
and Weber 1973). ‘Wicked’ in this sense does not imply evil, but describes a category of 
problems in the social sphere that are intractable and complex, unlike the ‘tame’ problems 
of the natural sciences, that are bounded, definable, and have a clear solution. Wicked 
problems are typically found in areas such as public policy, the environment, or conflict 
resolution. They are extraordinarily complex to understand and resolve and have multiple, 
mutually contradictory formulations, in which the solution to any one formulation 
generates irreversible consequences and leads to new problems.  
 
If development is viewed in this way, it provides an opening to understand the perpetual 
frustration at its inadequacies. That is, development involves the mismatch between the 
deep complexity of ‘little-d’ development - the wicked problem at hand - and the 
inadequate uni-dimensional scientific and managerial analytic modes of ‘big-D’ 
development, through which it is frequently mis-diagnosed and burdened with counter-
productive interventions.6 In this encounter, there are no objective ‘true-false’ outcomes, 
but only ‘good-bad’ ones, of which there can be many interpretations. As Rittell and Weber 
(1973:163) explain: 
 
many parties are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judge the solutions, 
although none has the power to set formal decision rules to determine correctness. Their 
judgments are likely to differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their 
special value-sets, and their ideological predilections. 
 
Failure and disappointment is in that sense, pre-determined in the circumstances of this 
encounter between social complexity and technical rigidity, and it thus invokes the Anna 
Karenina principle: that there are multiple criteria under which a project can fail, and 
success is only possible where all such criteria and constituencies have been addressed. 
Since the criteria are mutually exclusive, it is impossible to meet them all, so that success is 
impossible, and failure is constantly reproduced. 
 
                                                 
6  A similar understanding is evident in the use of complexity theory in development (Ramalingam 2013) and in 
framing the idea of resilience (Chandler 2014) as a response to it. 
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It is perhaps under the weight of this perpetual sense of frustration that Wolfgang Sachs 
declared development as an obsolete failure in the early 1990s: ‘delusion and 
disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development, and 
they tell a common story: it did not work … development has grown obsolete’ (Sachs 
1992:1). Sachs is at one level symptomatic of the negativity and pessimism that wicked 
problems can generate. But he has been proven wrong, in that development has not 
become obsolete. In fact, the persistent lament that development has failed has not for the 
most part, threatened this enterprise. On the contrary, it could be said that the narrative of 
failure has served to reproduce, renew, and sustain development, in the sense that it is 
success that would make it obsolete. Why is this the case? Is it possible, without lapsing into 
a conspiracy theory, to ask how the negativity and pessimism about development have 
productive instrument effects? I conclude by suggesting two possible mechanisms.  
 
Firstly, one can draw on Linsey McGoey’s account of ‘profitable failure’, which examines the 
reproduction of randomised control trials (RCT) in the pharmaceutical industry. She notes 
that the failures of RCTs do not lead to a weakening of their authority but to their 
strengthening, as it leads to demands for more RCTs to provide new evidence. As McGoey 
(2010:74) says: 
 
 If anything, the more useless RCTs are in practice, the more their strength is augmented, as 
more and more practitioners rally around a call for more RCTs in order to remedy the failings 
of previous trials.  
 
The development enterprise is constantly under attack, but it has been extraordinarily 
successful in absorbing and coopting critique, leading to the constant re-invention and 
accretive growth of both theory and practice. For example, Robert Chambers’s (1994) 
argument that development was a top-down imposition subsequently led to the adoption of 
participatory methods within mainstream development practice. Indeed, participation 
became so well integrated that it came to be described the ‘new tyranny’ (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). Similarly, the critique of the social consequences of structural adjustment in 
the 1980s led eventually to the World Bank’s embrace of the poverty agenda in the 1990s, 
and to the drafting of the Millennium Development Goals. Critique has as such not killed 
development, but has strengthened it and led to its growth and evolution. 
 
Secondly, the idea that failure can have productive effects recalls Arturo Escobar’s (1995) 
account of the way that representations of poverty ‘created’ the third world, and brought 
the development industry into being. Similarly, contemporary representations of 
development failure play an important role in sustaining the idea of intervening to end it. In 
the discursive construction of poverty as a global public tragedy, failure is cast on the one 
hand as a terrible real world condition, and on the other hand, as a moral failure of the 
world to act decisively to bring this reality to an end. In public campaigns around poverty, 
debt relief, or humanitarian aid, representations of failure play a critical role in energising 
the idea of development by generating the impulse to intervene once again to assist the 
world’s poor. The narrative of failure thus becomes productive and sustains the larger 
enterprise by keeping the wheel of tragedy, intervention, and disappointment spinning. 
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